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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Code, however, allows -remuneration if the business "has been
well managed." A reading of the opinion leaves one free to con-
clude that the broker had acted in a manner which appeared to
him to be his own best interest, rather than that of the seller or
purchaser.
IV. TORTS AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Wex S. Malone*
TORTS
A varied assortment of torts and workmen's compensation
cases was handed down by the supreme court during the past
term. Several of them were restricted to controversies of fact
and do not lend themselves readily to treatment.1 Other decisions
are sufficiently significant to merit comment. But it cannot be
said that the latest crops of cases has produced anything of start-
ling importance.
Traffic and Transportation
The Louisiana courts have often had occasion to comment
on the duty of a motorist who, having the right of way, never-
theless proceeds without regard for the safety of those who have
entered or are about to enter the intersection from a less favored
thoroughfare.2 However, until the recent decision in Kientz v.
Charles Dennery, Inc.,3 the supreme court had not dealt with the
situation presented where traffic lights determine the right of
way. The presence of "stop" and "go" signals alters the picture
slightly. Anyone who approaches an intersection against the light
knows that to proceed further is an arbitrary violation of the
law. He cannot discharge his duty simply by "reasonably giving
contemporaire (1921) 20 Rev. Prim. de droit civil 419, 458-461; and 7 Planiol
et Ripert, Trait6 Pratique de droit civil francais (1931) n. 731.
' Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Burns v. Evans Cooperate Co., Inc., 208 La. 406, 23 So.(2d) 165 (1945)
(plaintiff, a motorist, left road and was injured when defendant's car ahead
made a sudden turn to the left without signal. Evidence indicated plaintiff
was guilty of contributory negligence under the circumstances in attempt-
ing to pass.); Hebert v. Meibaum, 209 La. 156, 24 So.(2d) 297 (1945) (pedes-
trian struck by defendant's car while attempting to cross at street inter-
section. Evidence showed plaintiff precipitated himself suddenly in path of
vehicle, and there was no opportunity for defendant to stop); Pool v. Gaudin,
209 La. 218, 24 So.(2d) 383 (1945) (Defendant charged with defamation in
accusing plaintiff of refusing to pay his share of his mother's funeral ex-
penses. The case turned on the property implication to be drawn from the
accusing letter).
2. See Comment (1946) 5 LouisNA LAw Rvinw 432, 434-438.
3. 209 La. 144, 24 So.(2d) 292 (1945).
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way. The driver who moves with the green light is entitled to
assume this, and he can cross the intersection with some assur-
ance. Thus he need not be as cautious as one who is favored
merely by the rules of the road.4
Nevertheless, the driver who is favored by the light is not
wholly exempt from responsibility. If he discovers the presence
of a vehicle which has unlawfully entered his path, he must do
all reasonably within his power to avoid a collision. Further, he
must maintain some sort of a watchout. How extensive his obli-
gation may be in this latter respect is a matter upon which courts
wisely refrain from venturing a generalized opinion. In three
instances the courts of appeal of Louisiana have found that the
favored motorist proceeded arbitrarily or failed to exercise
"slight" care and have penalized him accordingly.5 In each of
these cases it is noteworthy that the accident occurred immedi-
ately after the light had shifted, and the other party to the col-
lision was either caught in mid-street by the light or he had
made the kind of improper adjustment to the change of light
that common experience shows is to be expected with fair regu-
larity at urban intersections. These deviations from the rules of
traffic are routine and their occurrence must be expected by the
motorist who proceeds with the light.
Once traffic is evacuated from the unfavored street a differ-
ent situation is presented. The motorist who proceeds with the
green light must be guilty of a serious departure from ordinary
care before his rights against the law violator can be affected.
No Louisiana case has been found in which the favored motorist
was held guilty of negligence under these circumstances.6 The
4. "Under the traffic light system, a motorist who is proceeding under
the proper signal should not be held to that same high degree of care and
vigilance as if no such system prevailed. He has a right to assume that the
signals are understood and will be observed .. " Buckley v. Featherstone
Garage, 11 La. App. 564, 123 So. 446 (1929). See also 2 Blashfield, Cyclopedia of
Automobile Law and Practice (1935) § 1040.
5. Thomas v. Roberts, 144 So. 70 (La. App. 1932); Capillon v. Lengsfleld,
171 So. 194 (La. App. 1936); Tooke v. Muslow Oil Co., 183 So. 97 (La. App.
1938).
6. In the following cases it was held that the motorist proceeding with
the green light was not negligent in failing to keep a watchout for those
who might enter the intersection from the unfavored direction: Buckley v.
Featherstone Garage, 123 So. 446 (La. App. 1929); Manuel v. Bradford, 166
So. 657 (La. App. 1936); Roll Osborn & Sons v. Howatt, 167 So. 466 (La. App.
1936); Seiner v. Toye Bros. Yellow Cab Co., 18 So.(2d) 189 (La. App. 1944);
FitzPatrick v. New Orleans Public Service Co., 22 So.(2d) 473 (La. App.
1945). In Manuel v. Bradford, supra, the highway favored at the time was a
boulevard on which the two traffic lanes were separated by a neutral ground.
The plaintiff observed the defendant and saw him enter the intersection
against the light and proceed across the other traffic lane leading to the
1947]
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Kientz case added nothing to the law except to sanction the con-
sistent position that had been taken heretofore by our courts of
appeal. The accident occurred some time after the lights had
shifted, and the defendant was not obliged to keep a watchout
for the possibility that plaintiff might run the light at such a
time. The court was content to say that a motorist who is pro-
ceeding on a proper signal, "should not be held to the same degree
of care and vigilance as if no such system prevailed." Identical
language had appeared earlier in the decision of the court of
appeal in Buckley v. Featherstone Garage.7
Normally, a person who places an obstruction in a highway
will face a difficult suit if he attempts to recover for some injury
inflicted on the obstruction during the course of ordinary traffic.
In fact, he is more likely to be subjected to an action for the
damage suffered by others because of his unlawful conduct.8
However, the fact that there is an encumbrance on the highway
which interferes somewhat with public passage will not relieve
motorists of the duty to use some degree of care to avoid a col-
lision. To knowingly encounter such an object is clearly an as-
sumption of risk. But beyond this it is hard to draw a definite
line. Certainly a motorist is not required to expect that the
public highways will be imperiled by the encumbrances of
others. Therefore, he need not be constantly alert for such dan-
gers.' But on the other hand, a motorist cannot close his eyes to
large objects that a routine lookout for the ordinary perils of
neutral ground. He nevertheless proceeded in reliance upon the fact that
the light was in his favor. The following statement appears in the opinion:
"May one who sees another 'violate a safety law in one respect assume he
will respect it in another? In other words, does the assumption that all per-
sons intend to obey the law exist in the case of one who has just violated
the very law which the other person assumes he will obey?
"Our answer is that, under the circumstances shown by this record,
[plaintiff] was justified in assuming that so long as it was possible for [de-
fendant] to obey the law to stop in order to accord him the right of way, he
[defendant] would do so."
7. 11 .La. App. 564, 123 So. 446 (1929).
8. See 2 Shearman and Redfield, Negligence (rev. ed. 1941) § 346 for a
variety of examples of obstructions to the lawful passage of vehicles.
9. This is a corollary of the broader rule that a motorist is entitled to
assume that the use of the highway will not be imperiled by the general
negligence of others, unless facts within his knowledge would make such
an assumption unreasonable in a given instance. Cf. Work of Louisiana Su-
preme Court for the 1944-1945 Term-Torts (1946) 6 LouIsiANA LAW REVIEW
601, 603-604. However, the court of appeal has held that where the use of
the highway is imperiled by an excavation on defendant's land adjacent to
the way the passerby must be free of contributory negligence and will be
held to have seen what he should have seen. Notice, however, that a peril
of this sort, located wholly on defendant's own land, is hardly to be regarded
as an "obstruction." Bamburg v. Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana, 199 So. 411
(La. App. 1940).
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traffic would have revealed. This was the approach adopted by
the supreme court in Culpepper v. Leonard Truck Lines.10 De-
fendant's truck collided with a suspended fire escape which pro-
truded over a public alley and which had not been pulled up to
its full height above the way. The size of the obstruction and
its obvious position would have made it visible to defendant's
driver if he had been giving the attention to his driving that the
congested condition of the alley demanded. The court indicated
its willingness to characterize his conduct as recklessness if this
were necessary in order to justify the decision.
Prior to the enactment of Louisiana Railroad Fencing Law
in 188611 there was no duty on the part of a railroad to fence out
trespassing cattle." Furthermore the statute of 1886, unlike the
laws of some of the other states,13 did not impose this duty on
the railroads. It provided, however, that in the event the fencing
law was not complied with, the offending railroad must assume
the burden of proving that the death or injury was not the result
of carelessness on the part of its servants or agents. The effect
of this statute was twofold: first it made a non-fencing railroad
liable for the exercise of due and reasonable care with respect
to trespassing cattle upon its tracks; second, it cast upon the
defendant the burden of affirmatively exonerating itself from
the inference of negligence. In the recent case of Friedman's
Estate v. The Texas and Pacific Railway Co'mpany, 4 the su-
preme court held that a non-fencing railroad was liable for the
destruction of the plaintiff's cattle, which were killed upon a
trestle that the court found was so constructed that animals
could not readily escape from it upon the approach of a train.
Negligence was found likewise from the fact that the train ap-
proached this trestle from a curve, which precluded a fair view
ahead, and yet the train was operated at such a speed that it
was impossible to stop in time to avoid accident after the ani-
mals were seen or could have been seen through the exercise of
a reasonable watchout.
The conclusion reached by the court seems fair enough.
However, the decision proceeds on the erroneous idea that the
animals were trespassers upon the defendants' tracks and that
10. 208 La. 1084, 24 So.(2d) 148 (1945).
11. La. Act 70 of 1886 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 8154].
12. Stevens v. New Orleans etc. R.R., 35 La. Ann. 498 (1883).
13. See statutes listed in 3 Shearman and Redfleld, Negligence (rev. ed.
1941) § 412.
14. 209 La. 540, 25 So.(2d) 88 (1945).
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the case was therefore to be governed by the rules concerning
the liability of landowners to anticipated trespassers. This as-
sumption of course is not well founded in view of the fact that
the statute of 1886 imposed the duty of reasonable care upon
all railroads who chose not to fence their rights of way. The
analogy used in the decision which compared trespassing ani-
mals with trespassing children and thus led to a review of the
attractive nuisance doctrine can serve only to confuse the law
on this subject.
Highly Dangerous Activities
Persons who deal in gas, electricity and other highly dan-
gerous substances must exercise care commensurate with the
unusual peril that is involved."5 In such cases the liability im-
posed is virtually absolute, although the situation may be dis-
cussed by the court in terms of negligence. The decisions con-
'tain frequent references to the "highest degree of care,"' 6 and
res ipsa loquitur is readily available to supply proof of the de-
fendant's shortcomings."
Recently the supreme court again has emphasized the strict
accountability of a person who installs a mechanism that utilizes
gas.' 8 In Jones v. Blossman 9 defendant had installed a gas water
heater in plaintiff's residence. The device was set up in a small
closet at plaintiff's request. At the time of the installation the
closet was open, but a door was later provided, and defendant
warned plaintiff to keep this open at all times. Oversight of these
instructions caused raw gas in the heater to explode, and defen-
dant was held responsible. The court found that the place of
installation was unsuitable according to the rules of the National
Board of Fire Underwriters. Perhaps more important, it was
found that outlets could have been cut in the floor or door at
small expense. The defendant's profession of competence and his
assurance that the installation could be safely made were impor-
15. Bradley v. Shreveport Gas Co., 142 La. 49, 76 So. 230 (1917); Hebert v.
Baton Rouge Electric Co., 150 La. 957, 91 So. 406 (1922).
16. In Feely v. National Packing Co., 141 La. 903, 75 So. 837 (1917), a gas
company was notified of a peculiar odor but delayed several hours before
investigating. In holding the company liable for a resulting explosion the
court stated that the failure to investigate at once was negligence, "perhaps
no very grave negligence; but gas companies are held to a very high degree
of care." 141 La. 903, 909, 75 So. 837, 839.
17. See cases collected in Malone, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Proof by In-
ference-A Discussion of the Louisiana Cases (1941) 4 LOUISANA LAJW R-
visw 70, 85-97.
18. Cf. Loyocano v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 165 So. 515 (La. App.
1936).
19. 209 La. 530, 25 So.(2d) 85 (1946).
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tant factors inducing the court to dismiss the contention that the
plaintiff assumed the risk by accepting and even suggesting the
place of installation with knowledge of the danger.
Damages
In most jurisdictions the proper measure of damages for
injury to movable property is the simple formula of depreciation,
i.e., the difference between the value before and the value im-
mediately after the injury."0 Under this test the reasonable cost
of repairing the article may be shown as bearing upon the di-
minution in its value resulting from the injury. The cost of re-
pair, however, is usually not conclusive, because the repaired
article might not be as valuable as it would have been had the
injury not been inflicted.21 In Louisiana, however, the cost of
repair seems to have been favored as the controlling measure of
damages in most cases.22 The problem of the measurement of
damages becomes more difficult when unusual economic condi-
tions disrupt the normal used car market. Under such circum-
stances the urge to use the cost-of-repairs test is almost irresis-
tible. This test was applied recently in the case of Goode v.
Hantz.2 The plaintiff's car was badly wrecked through the neg-
ligence of the defendant. The lower court fixed the damages at
the difference between the salvage value of the car ($500) and
the ceiling price prevailing for the same make and model auto-
mobile ($1689.10). This seemed fair enough in view of the fact
that during the period in question a car of this make and model
In any kind of passable condition could be sold at ceiling price.
Ifowever, the trial court's action was reversed on appeal to the
-supreme court, which found that the amount of about $750 was
til that would be required to repair the plaintiff's car. This posi-
tion is defensible only on the rather doubtful assumption that a
car receiving repairs as extensive as seem to have been neces-
sary in this case would thereafter be in as good condition as it
was prior to the accident.
The court refused to make an award for rental value during
the period that would be required for repairs. The asserted
ground for this refusal was that the plaintiff had made no claim
in his petition for rental value. It is natural, of course, that the
20. McCormick, Damages (1935) § 124.
21. See, for example, Chicago, Rock Island & G.Ry. Co. v. Zumwalt, 239
S.W. 912 (Tex. Com. App. 1922).
22. See cases cited in Goode v. Hantz, 209 La. 821, 825, 25 So.(2d) 604, 605
(1946).
23. 209 La. 821, 25 So.(2d) 604 (1946).
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plaintiff would have made no such claim in view of the fact that
he was seeking damages in the amount of the difference between
the salvage value of his own car and the purchase price of a
replacement. The court had before it evidence of the amount of
time required to make the repairs and there is no apparent reason
why the case could not have been remanded for the purpose of
determining the reasonable rental value during that period.
Trespass
The practice of prospecting for oil through unauthorized
entry upon the land of others seems to continue and the courts
are faced with difficult damage problems which arise from such
trespasses. If the results of the defendant's unauthorized pros-
pecting is the discovery of oil upon the plaintiff's premises, the
information so gained is usually used by the defendant to gain
an unfair bargaining advantage over the landowner. If, on the
other hand, the prospecting discloses the fact that there is no
mineral wealth, this information soon becomes public property
and the plaintiff loses the former speculative value of his hold-
ings. Several years ago our supreme court had held that an un-
authorized entry of this sort, which proved the plaintiff's land
to have no value for the purposes of producing oil warranted
the plaintiff claiming damages in the amount of the depreciation
of the speculative value of his property when the defendant let
the cat out of the sack.24 A similar problem arose recently in the
case of Layne Louisiana Company v. Superior Oil Company. 5
In this case, however, the plaintiff was unable to show that the
defendant's discoveries affected the value of his property for
royalty purposes. He was, in effect, claiming damage for the
appropriations of the privilege of making geophysical tests. It
was shown that the generally prevailing price for shooting privi-
leges in that community was fifty cents to a dollar per acre. The
trial court, however, considered that five dollars per acre as
claimed by plaintiff was a fair value for each acre of land in-
vaded. This was affirmed by the supreme court.2 6 It is clear from
24. Angelloz v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 196 La. 604, 199 So. 656 (1940). Ma-
lone, Ruminations on a New Tort (1942) 4 LOUISANA LAW REvimw 309. See
also Green, What Protection Has a Landowner Against a Trespass which
merely Destroys the Speculative Value of his Property? (1925) 4 Texas L.
Rev. 215.
25. 209 La. 1014, 26 So. (2d) 20 1946).
26. Compare the method of assessment employed in Shell Petroleum
Corp. v. Scully, 71 F.(2d) 772 (C.C.A. 5th, 1934). Usually the exploration
privilege is purchased in conjunction with a selection lease. This makes the
market value of such privileges of somewhat doubtful utility as a means of
measuring damages.
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the general tenor of the opinion that the large amount of the
award was justified because of the flagrant character of the de-
fendant's intrusion and the necessity of awarding substantial
damages to discourage similar conduct in the future.
Prescription
The problem of prescription in connection with continuous
torts has plagued the supreme court again in two recent deci-
sions. It is normally assumed that a party who sets up the fact
that his adversary's cause of action has prescribed must sustain
the burden of establishing the facts of prescription upon which
he relies. The normal prescriptive period for tort actions is one
year. However, Article 3537 of the Civil Code provides that
where property has been injured or destroyed the period of
prescription starts running only from the date that knowledge
of the damage was received by the owner. This qualification was
added by amendment in 1902,7 and its effect is to establish an
exception to the normal rule that the prescriptive period starts
running on the date of the commission of the tort. It follows that
the plaintiff who wishes to recover for damage inflicted more
than one year prior to the institution of his action and who relies
upon the fact that he did not gain knowledge of the damage
until a later date is in effect pleading a suspension of the normal
running of prescription. Thus it is proper that under such cir-
cumstances he should be required to show affirmatively the time
at which he gained knowledge of the damage, and the courts
have so held.
When, however, the plaintiff does not rely upon late discov-
ery there is no reason why the usual rule requiring the defendant
to establish affirmatively the facts of prescription should not
apply. Nevertheless loose language in the decisions has sug-
gested that in the case of destruction of or damage to property
the plaintiff must show that the tort was committed or the dam-
age accrued within a period of one year prior to the institution
of action. This is probably due to the inept language of the 1902
amendment referred to above. The result is to place on the plain-
tiff in a tort action a burden that properly should be shouldered
by the party who seeks to rely on the plea of prescription. The
most recent controversy perpetuating this error is Parro v. Fif-
teen Oil Company.8 The case is noted elsewhere in the Review
and further comment here is unnecessary. The basic unfairness
27. La. Act 33 of 1902.
28. 26 So.(2d) 30 (La. App. 1946).
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of this position has forced the courts to create arbitrary excep-
tions. In the recent case, In re Union Central Life Insurance
Company," the court announced its adherence to the general
rule that ordinarily in cases of the destruction of property the
party against whom prescription is pleaded must show when
the loss occurred. It avoided the implication of this position,
however, by stating that the rule as announced does not apply
where the plaintiff was not in possession of the land on which
the property was situated during the period complained of. The
court suggested that the burden of proving prescriptive facts
should rest upon the party who is in the better position to know
when the damage occurred. Thus bad law has been countered
with confusion and perhaps more bad law. The writer suggests
that the only solution to the problem is a clear recognition of
the fact that the party who pleads prescription has the burden
of establishing the prescriptive facts. Only if the claimant against
whom prescription is pleaded wishes to avoid the normal con-
sequences of prescription should he be required affirmatively to
show the facts on which his claim of suspension depends. Despite
the language of the 1902 amendment, such a position is still open
to the courts.
An amendment of Article 3537 would obviate the present
confusion. That article presently reads in part as follows:
"The prescription mentioned in the preceding article [the
one year prescriptive period affecting offenses and quasi of-
fenses] runs: .... Where land, timber or property has been
injured, cut, damaged or destroyed from the date knowledge
of such damage is received by the owner thereof."
It is suggested that this article would accomplish its purpose
and would at the same time not be susceptible of the present
unfortunate interpretation, if it were to read as follows:
The prescription mentioned in the preceding section runs:
S... Where land, timber or other property has been injured,
cut, damaged, or destroyed from the date of such destruction
or infliction of damage. Provided, however, that the party
claiming damage may show that he did not receive knowledge
of his loss until after the destruction or infliction of damage
had taken place, and in such event prescription shall run only
from the date such knowledge was received.
29. 208 La. 253, 23 So.(2d) 63 (1945).
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Indemnity and Contribution
Although the Louisiana courts have recognized the right of
one tortfeasor to indemnity from another when the claimant is
guilty of no fault and has been subjected to liability only because
of some arbitrary rule of law, it has never made entirely clear
the requisites necessary to a successful prosecution of his claim.
Certainly it is not necessary that a solidary judgment has been
secured by the original plaintiff against both the claimant and
defendant, 0 although the existence of such a judgment would
be essential if the claimant had been guilty of personal fault
and were seeking contribution."1 Nevertheless the claimant of
indemnity must show that he discharged an existent obligation
which, as between him and defendants, should in good conscience
have been shouldered by the latter. In the recent case of Winford
v. Bullock, 2 a master who had been sued for the negligence of
his servant compromised the suit after judgment but prior to
the expiration of the period within which he could have appeal-
ed. He then claimed indemnity from the servant for the amount
of the compromise. The supreme court refused relief because the
sum paid by claimant was not shown to be a payment under
compulsion, but was rather the price of being relieved of the
uncertainty of the result of appeal. This would seem to require
a final judgment against the claimant as a prerequisite to in-
demnity. However, the language of the decision might be inter-
preted as indicating that had the claimant showed affirmatively
that the amount of the compromise was fair and represented no
more than he would have been required to pay under a final
judgment he would have succeeded in his claim for indemnity.8
The case deserves closer consideration than is possible here, and
it will be treated in a forthcoming note in the Louisiana Law
Review.
WORKVIEN'S COMPENSATION
When the Louisiana Supreme Court decided in 1942 that
persons other than those designated in Section 8(2) (D) of the
30. Appalachian Corp. v. Brooklyn Cooperate Co., 151 La. 41, 91 So. 539
(1922), is the leading Louisiana case on indemnity. Judgment had been se-
cured against claimant, but not against defendant.
31. Quatray v. Wicker, 178 La. 289, 151 So. 208 (1933); Aetna Life Ins.
Co. v. DeJean, 185 La. 1074, 171 So. 450 (1936).
32. 210 La. 301, 26 So.(2d) 822 (1946).
83. In an early case the supreme court had held that the fact that the
plaintiff had compromised the suit against him did not preclude his action
for indemnity. Brannan, Patterson and Holliday v. Hoel, 15 La. Ann. 308
(1860).
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Workmen's Compensation Act might nevertheless recover as
dependent members of decendant's family under Section 8 (2) (E)
of the act,3 4 it opened the door to a reconsideration of the claims
of unacknowledged illegitimate children and stepchildren and of
concubines. The ruling was promptly followed by the much dis-
cussed decision of Thompson v. Vestal Lumber and Manufactur-
ing Company," which held that an unacknowledged illegitimate
child is entitled to compensation where it is a dependent member
of the family and there are no other dependents designated in
the act whose claim would take preference. In such case, of
course, dependency is not presumed, as in the case of legitimate
children, and must be proved as a fact. Later, the court of ap-
peal for the first circuit announced that a dependent concubine
does not enjoy a similar privilege. " Although this distinction is
difficult to understand on principle, nevertheless, a writ of cer-
tiorari was refused,"7 and the matter must be regarded as settled
for the present.
More recently, in Dangerfield v. Indemnity Insurance Com-
pany,"' the supreme court held that an illegitimate stepchild,
born of an illicit relationship between the mother and a third
party, cannot recover as a "child" under Section 8(2) (H) of the
act. This ruling seems eminently correct both from the stand-
point of construction and fairness. Since the decedent's own il-
legitimate child must come in as "other" dependent and prove
both actual dependency and the non-existence of preferred clai-
mants under the Thompson case, it is clear that the illegitimate
stepchild should not receive preferential treatment. The court
carefully pointed out that no effort was made to show depend-
ency in fact and the situation does not fall under the protection
of the rule of the Thompson case.
34. Archibald v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., 202 La. 89, 11 So.
(2d) 492 (1942) (in-laws allowed compensation).
35. 208 La. 83, 22 So.(2d) 842 (1945), noted in (1945) 20 Tulane L. Rev.
145 and (1945) 6 LOUISIANA LAW RVIW 482.
36. Moore v. Capitol Glass & Supply Co., 25 So.(2d) 248 (La. App. 1946).
The court distinguished the concubine from the illegitimate child on the
ground that the former is responsible for having assumed the illegal rela-
tionship, while the child is not. This sudden and anomalous solicitude for
morality in the family is hard to understand. Apparently a chronically adul-
terous, but dependent, legitimate wife could recover, even at the expense of a
dependent illegitimate child, despite her moral transgressions and her abuse
of the very relationship on which she depends. The opinion also seems to
overlook the large number of good faith irregular unions among the negro
working classes where a complete and permanent family relationship in fact
grows from such a union.
37. Writ of error refused May 27, 1946.
38. 209 La. 195, 24 So.(2d) 375 (1945).
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Since the leading case of Knispel v. Gulf States Utilities
Company"9 the supreme court has adhered faithfully to the posi-
tion that a skilled workman is to be regarded as being totally
disabled when he is rendered unable to do work of a character
reasonably similar to that performed prior to the accident, even
though he may demonstrate his ability to earn a substantial
amount at some other calling. This position is not only eminently
fair in view of the compromise character of workmen's compen-
sation, but offers the additional advantage of being simpler to
administer than any competing interpretation. This position was
reaffirmed recently in Ranatza v. Higgins Industries."° Prior to
the accident plaintiff's wage as a skilled carpenter averaged
$62.50 per week. Thereafter he was able to earn an average of
$30.00 per week as part time bus driver. The court refused to
regard the disability as partial only. It is perhaps noteworthy that
the net effect of a contrary ruling would have been only to reduce
the maximum period of compensation from four hundred weeks
to three hundred weeks, since the amount of compensation to be
awarded under either view would exceed the permissible twenty
dollar maximum.
V. BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LAW
BUSINESS AsSOCIATIONS
Dale E. Bennett*
Ostensible Authority of President of Corporation
The general rule is frequently stated that the president-di-
rector of a corporation is merely presiding officer of the board
of directors. He has no more authority than any other director
in the management of corporate affairs-a matter which is under
the control and responsibility of the entire board.1 However,
there is a tendency in modern business to put the president in
general charge of business, with the result that courts have fre-
quently held that he has, at least prima facie, authority of a
general manager to conduct the ordinary, everyday business of
the corporation.2 Even where the strict rule prevails, the presi-
39. 174 La. 401, 141 So. 9 (1932).
40. 208 La. 198, 23 So.(2d) 45 (1945).
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Knopf v. Alma Park, Inc., 105 N. J. Eq. 299, 147 AtI. 590 (1929).
2. Schwartz v. United Merchants & Manufacturers, Inc., 72 F. (2d) 256
(C. C. A. 2d, 1934).
